貸款是銀行或其他金融機(jī)構(gòu)按一定利率和必須歸還等條件出借貨幣資金的一種信用活動(dòng)形式。接下來小編為大家整理了銀行為何不愿放貸，希望對你有幫助哦!

　　Why won’t those wretched banks lend money? That is aquestion many European andAmerican politicians have asked inrecent months.

　　為什么那些該死的銀行不肯放貸?幾個(gè)月來，歐洲和美國的許多政客一直在問這個(gè)問題。

　　For as the global economy ails, there is growing anxiety about the seeming failure ofbanks tosupport growth. So much so, in fact, that this week my Financial Times colleaguesreported thatBritish regulators are now quietly loosening some bank rules to encourage moreloans – particularlyto small businesses, and other seemingly “worthy” borrowers.

　　他們之所以這么問，是因?yàn)殡S著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入困境，有一件事讓他們感到越來越擔(dān)心，那就是銀行似乎沒能對經(jīng)濟(jì)增長起到支持作用。實(shí)際上，正因?yàn)槿绱?，英國監(jiān)管部門現(xiàn)在才悄悄放松了一些銀行業(yè)規(guī)定，以鼓勵(lì)銀行發(fā)放更多貸款，特別是面向小企業(yè)和其他看似“值得考慮”的借款人發(fā)放——這條消息來自我英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》同事近日的報(bào)道。

　　But as the political frustration bubbles, it is instructive to take a look at a presentationabout bankbehaviour recently made by Phil Coffey, the chief financial officer of Westpac, toAustralianregulators and financiers.

　　但在政界的失望情緒日益高漲之時(shí)，我們卻應(yīng)當(dāng)去看看西太平洋銀行(Westpac)首席財(cái)務(wù)官菲爾 科菲(PhilCoffey)近期所做的一個(gè)講演。這個(gè)講演的主題是銀行行為，聽眾是澳大利亞的監(jiān)管人士和金融家。

　　For while Mr Coffey’s vision is primarily shaped by the Antipodean market, his commentsapply toEurope and the US too; indeed, the only difference is that Mr Coffey’s location leaveshim speakingwith a sense of clarity and honesty that is (sadly) all too rare in the politically-charged arena of theCity or Wall Street.

　　之所以這么說，是因?yàn)殡m然科菲的愿景主要基于地球另一端的市場，但他的意見卻對歐美同樣適用;實(shí)際上，唯一有區(qū)別的地方在于，科菲發(fā)表講演的地點(diǎn)不在政治色彩濃郁的倫敦金融城或華爾街，因此他的講話帶有一種在這兩地極其罕見的清晰與實(shí)在(這種罕見真令人悲哀)。

　　So what, in Mr Coffey’s view, is the reason why those banks will not make more loans? Hecitesthree key points. The first issue (which is often underplayed) is a change in the behaviourof bankcustomers.

　　那么，在科菲看來，那些銀行不肯發(fā)放更多貸款的原因是什么?科菲提出了三大原因。第一點(diǎn)(這一點(diǎn)往往不受重視)是，銀行客戶的行為發(fā)生了改變。

　　Most notably, as I have noted in previous columns, consumers and companies are currentlyin adeleveraging mindset. Hence 41 per cent of Australians want to put their spare cash into abankdeposit, up from 28 per cent five years ago, and 23 per cent want to pay down debt,double theratio five years ago.

　　正如我在以前的專欄文章里指出的，尤其值得注意的是，消費(fèi)者和企業(yè)目前都有減輕債務(wù)的心態(tài)。在這種心態(tài)下，41%的澳大利亞人想將閑錢存入銀行，而五年前這一比例只有28%;23%的澳大利亞人有意減債，這一比例是五年前的兩倍。

　　And “like households, firms have tended to behave cautiously, prudently consolidatingtheirbalance sheets, limiting debt and growing their holdings of low-risk assets,” Mr Coffey says.

　　科菲表示：“與老百姓一樣，企業(yè)也傾向于謹(jǐn)慎行事，審慎地鞏固資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表，限制債務(wù)，增持低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)。”

　　Little wonder, then, that Australian bank deposits are an eye-popping 54 per cent up fromlate 2007.

　　難怪澳大利亞銀行現(xiàn)在的存款總額會(huì)較2007年底增長54%，這一增幅著實(shí)令人驚嘆。

　　Secondly – and more obvious – banks are being affected by a deluge of regulatoryreform. Nevermind those Basel Capital rules that financiers keep complaining about; subtlereforms on, say, liquidity coverage ratios are also biting hard.

　　第二點(diǎn)、也是更加明顯的一點(diǎn)是，銀行正受到監(jiān)管改革浪潮的影響。先不提金融家們抱怨不已的巴塞爾資本金規(guī)定;就拿流動(dòng)性覆蓋比率的細(xì)微改革來說，這實(shí)際上已經(jīng)很讓銀行頭疼了。

　　This makes banks far more conservative about lending money and fearful about how theymanagetheir balance sheets. In particular, chief financial officers are desperate to hang on totheir swellingdeposits, by cultivating long term relationships and paying more to depositors.

　　這種改革使得銀行在放貸方面變得大為保守，在管理自身資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表方面也變得格外小心。特別是銀行的首席財(cái)務(wù)官，他們正通過培養(yǎng)長期客戶關(guān)系和以更高的利息吸引儲(chǔ)戶，來拼命確保存款額不斷增長。

　　Then there is a third, less-recognised – but equally crucial – issue: funding.

　　接下來是第三點(diǎn)(這一點(diǎn)不太受認(rèn)可、但其實(shí)同樣關(guān)鍵)：資金因素。

　　Before 2007, CFOs presumed that they could always meet rising credit demand fromtheircustomers by tapping wholesale markets. The dominant cultural vision of credit, as asocialanthropologist might say, was an elastic thing. But during the financial crisis, wholesalemarketssuddenly closed, cutting off that source of credit for banks and prompting groupssuch as “Northern Rock, HBOS, Dexia, Countrywide, Washington Mutual and so on” to collapse.

　　2007年前，首席財(cái)務(wù)官們認(rèn)為，他們總是能夠借助批發(fā)市場來滿足客戶不斷增長的信用需求。社會(huì)人類學(xué)家或許會(huì)說，主流文化觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，信用是有彈性的。但在金融危機(jī)期間，批發(fā)市場突然關(guān)閉，切斷了銀行的信用來源，并造成“北巖銀行(Northern Rock)、蘇格蘭哈里法克斯銀行(HBOS)、德克夏銀行(Dexia)、美國國家金融服務(wù)公司(Countrywide)、華盛頓互惠銀行(Washington Mutual)等”金融集團(tuán)的崩潰。

　　That sparked a cognitive shift: suddenly credit was no longer viewed as a bottomless pitbutbecame a finite commodity which needed to be rationed.

　　這引發(fā)了一次認(rèn)知上的轉(zhuǎn)變：突然之間，信用不再被視為極大豐富，而是一種需要限量供應(yīng)的有限商品。

　　Or, as Mr Coffey says, the days of “tapping endless wholesale funding to meet all comersarebehind us”. And while central banks have tried to replace those wholesale markets, fewCFOs trustthat this central bank money will always be there.

　　或者正如科菲所言：“那種利用無盡的批發(fā)市場資金來滿足所有客戶需求(的日子)已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了。”盡管各國央行試圖取代這些批發(fā)市場，但很少有首席財(cái)務(wù)官相信央行的資金能隨叫隨到。

　　That has not just affected recent behaviour but could curb loans in the future, too. Mostnotably, if there is more demand from customers for credit in future times, banks are likely toration thatcredit by raising the price.

　　這不僅影響到了近期的放貸行為，也對未來的放貸行為產(chǎn)生了抑制。尤其值得注意的是，如果未來客戶對信用的需求上升，銀行很可能會(huì)通過提高利息來限量供給信用。